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JOINT VENTURES ABROAD AND PER SE
ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Considerable disagreement exists as to what type of inquiry
the courts are using or should use when applying Section One of
the Sherman Antitrust Act to American activities overseas. Re-
cent cases indicate that the Supreme Court is expanding the con-
cept of per se illegality. If the restraint is of the type considered
to be without redeemable virtue, the activity is conclusively pre-
sumed illegal per se without further inquiry or allowance of af-
firmative defenses. Restraints not so readily identifiable or with
redeemable virtue are inquired into by the rule of reason. This
article places special emphasis on the impact of the per se doc-
trine on joint ventures located abroad and the problems incurred
in its application. Although Congress has made some attempt
to correct suggested inadequacies, the best guidelines have come
from the courts by way of direct litigation.
THE JOINT VENTURE CONCEPT
In the last twenty-five years, the growth of business invest-
ment abroad by the United States has been so immense that in
1967 it was predicted that within the next fifteen years the third
industrial power in the world would be the American industry in
Europe.1 A large proportion of this business activity is shared by
two or more corporations. The activity of the two or more com-
panies becomes a joint venture when the parties join their property
interests, skills and risks leading to varying degrees of participation
in direction and management. 2 "In its simplest terms, . . . a joint
1. J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE 3 (1967). More
than ten-billion dollars have been invested in Western Europe by American
Corporations from 1958 until present. SERVAN-SCHREIBER attributes this growth
and success to "the (American) ability to adapt easily, flexibility of organiza-
tion, (and) the creative power of teamwork." Id. at 251-2. In fact, he states
that European firms are and should continue copying U.S. methods of combining
and joining with each other in order to better compete and progress. Id.
J. MCMILLAN AND B. HARRIs, THE AMERICAN TAKEOVER OF BRITAIN 4, 5
(1968). Over 1600 firms are operating in Britain with more than one-half
million employees. Moreover, America's equity in Britain is now fifteen times
what it was in 1939. In some cases such as with Yale locks, Kodak color
films, and Singer sewing machines, American firms literally monopolize the
market.
2. This is a combination of the definitions of two authors: Tractenburg,
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venture is the creation of a new business organization which is
owned by two or more enterprises."'3  The joint venture is also
known as the "jointly owned subsidiary," the "fifty-fifty corpora-
tion," the "business co-operative," and the "corporate partnership."4
These jointly owned enterprises sometimes are composed of Ameri-
can and foreign firms in the foreign country, or an American com-
pany in cooperation with foreigners in a third country. In other
instances the joint venture involves only United States corporations
such as a group of American companies set up jointly abroad, or
an American corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary located
overseas.
PER SE-THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT TEST
Despite the increasing joint venture activity, the scope of
legality of joint venture relationships has not been decided. Sec-
tion One of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits "Every contract,
combination . . . conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states or with foreign nations. . . ." The
purpose of a joint venture is the pooling of interests to accomplish
common objectives. 6 While many create mere transitory rela-
Joint Ventures on the Domestic Front: A Study in Uncertainty, 8 ANTITRUST
BULL. 798 (1963); K. BREWSTER, JR., ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
200 (1958). Tractenburg states that a "joint venture is any association between
business entities which results in their pooling resources and skills which even-
tually leads to participation in a business activity." Brewster advocates a rather
narrowed definition: "a joint venture is an activity whose direction and manage-
ment is shared by two or more actual or potential competitors." His test
whether the venture is really joint is to ask whether two otherwise independent
competitors have combined in the management and direction.
In the broadest form the joint venture comprises any form of association
which implies collaboration for more than a very transitory period. FRIEDMAN
AND KALMANOFF, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES 6 (1961). Joint
ventures used in this indefinite fashion may take the form of a simple agree-
ment for buying or selling arrangements restricted to a particular field or to a
particular product. In addition, these non-equity joint ventures may consist of
sharing technical resources, management or franchises. M. Gordon, Joint Busi-
ness Ventures in the Central American Common Market, 21 VAND. L. REV. 315
(1968).
3. J. Backman, Joint Ventures and the Antitrust Laws, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV.
651 (1965).
4. P. Dixon, Joint Ventures: What is Their Impact on Competition? 7
ANTITRUST BULL. 397 (1962).
5. 26 STAT. 209 (1890); 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
6. Joint ventures are formed (1) to spread the risk of new industrial de-
velopments, (2) to accumulate large amounts of capital, (3) to establish one
joint facility for greater economy, and (4) to undertake programs too vast for
individual companies to handle.
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tionships, it is the more permanent ones that raise serious antitrust
issues because a joint venture of long duration often eliminates
competition between its participants.'
A large number of recent decisions of the Supreme Court
concerning joint ventures denote a rigid antitrust policy of abso-
lutes by application of the per se doctrine. Per se procedure
merely requires establishing the existence of the restraint consid-
ered to be inherently anticompetitive and deems it conclusively
illegal without further inquiry. The most famous statement of the
concept of per se illegality, although a joint venture was not in-
volved, was made in Northern Pacific Railroad v. United States:
. . . [T]here are certain agreements or practices which because
of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any re-
deeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreason-
able and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the
precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their
use. The principles of per se reasonableness not only makes
the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman
Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it
also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and
prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the
industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to
determine at large whether a particular restraint has been un-
reasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when under-
taken.8
Thus per se rules are the means by which the courts eliminate
evidentiary steps pertaining to the government's burden of proof
concerning agreements and practices which are by their very na-
ture anticompetitive and completely lacking in redeeming virtue.
Proof that the defendant did in fact employ these types of restraints
is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of a Section One viola-
tion.9 Among practices which have been held to be per se viola-
tions are price fixing, 10 tying arrangements, 1 and division of
7. However, joint ventures abroad have been attacked by the United
States Government only occasionally U.S. v. National Lead, 332 U.S. 319
(1947); Imperial Chemical Industries v. U.S., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1952), while antitrust activity between joint ventures inside the boundaries of the
United States continues at an increasingly vigorous pace.
8. Northern Pac. Ry. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
9. Id.
10. U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223, rehearing denied,
310 U.S. 658 (1940).
11. International Salt Co. v. U.S., 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
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markets and territories. 2 However, the inquiry of the court con-
tinues if the restraint does not currently belong to the class that has
been established as being illegal per se. The court then proceeds
to determine if the identified restraint is so sufficiently anticom-
petitive that it should be deemed illegal per se. If the violation is
not of the type which can be categorized as by its very nature anti-
competitive and completely without redeeming virtue, then the na-
ture of inquiry changes and per se rules are no longer applicable.
As a preferred alternative, the courts have employed another type
of inquiry commonly known as the rule of reason. The reasonable-
ness under the fact is decided on a case-by-case basis, inviting an
inquiry into the history, economical effect on competition, reason
and purpose of restraint, and other factors.
Because the joint venture should operate completely inde-
pendent of the parents, the per se doctrine applies whenever the
parent subsidiary relationship vociferates with per se illegal type
of restraints. However, where the degree or intensity is such that
the restraint cannot be so clearly identified, then the inquiry may
be more in the nature of the rule of reason. For example, the
joint venture may operate autonomously except in the area of pric-
ing. Mere approval of price schedules by the parent probably is
outside any type of inquiry, but when the parent controls or es-
tablishes the pricing, then the joint venture is subject to per se ap-
proach procedure. Somewhere in between, depending upon the
particular court deciding the case, operates the rule of reason.
The application of the per se concept to joint ventures abroad
began when, in a series of decisions, the violation was based only
upon findings of fact of a combination to achieve an unlawful
purpose.' 3 Thus, any conspiracy to which an American com-
pany is a party when the purpose is to restrain domestic or foreign
commerce of the United States is violative of the Sherman Act
regardless of the fact that the conduct complained of occurs in
whole or in part in foreign countries.' 4 To date those decisions
governing overseas joint ventures differ little from the domestic
results concerning joint ventures. On the other hand, there is not
12. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. U.S., 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
13. American Tobacco v. U.S., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); U.S. v. National
Lead, 332 U.S. 319 (1947); General Electric v. U.S., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.
N.Y. 1948); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. U.S., 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
14. Zenith Radio Corporation v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100 (1969);
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
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sufficient judicial precedent to establish that there is absolutely





Price fixing according to the Supreme Court is "under the
Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the
effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the
price of a commodity, in interstate or foreign commerce and is
illegal per se. . ".."' Because price fixing is conclusively per
se illegal, the courts will refuse to permit evidence that price fixing
has extenuating circumstances. Consequently, the only defense
to a Section One violation involving price fixing is to prove that
the joint venture abroad does not affect the United States com-
merce or that the restraint in issue does not constitute price fix-
ing.1
6
The per se illegality concept was applied by the Supreme
Court in 1969 to Citizens Publishing Company,17 a domestic
joint venture. Two competitive daily newspapers in Tucson, Ari-
zona, entered into the agreement that each newspaper was to re-
tain its news and editorial departments and corporate identity
but the business operations were to be integrated. The Court held
that these companies were in violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act because price fixing, profit pooling and market control are
illegal per se.
Perhaps the most complete analysis of per se illegality to
agreements among competitors involving price was expressed in
Trenton Potteries Co. v. U.S.:
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if ef-
fective, is the elimination of one form of competition. The
power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, in-
volves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and
unreasonable prices. The reasonable price fixed today may
through economic and business changes become the unrea-
sonable price of tomorrow. Once established, it may be
15. U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221, rehearing denied,
310 U.S. 658 (1940).
16. U.S. v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
17. Citizen Publishing Co. v. U.S., 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
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maintained unchanged because of the absence of competi-
tion secured by the agreement for a price reasonable when
fixed. Agreements which create such potential power may
well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful
restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a
particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and
without placing on the government in enforcing the Sherman
Law the burden of ascertaining from day to day whether it
has become unreasonable through the mere variation of
economic conditions. Moreover, in the absence of express
legislation requiring it, we should hesitate to adopt a construc-
tion making the difference between legal and illegal conduct
in the field of business relations depend upon so uncertain a
test as whether prices are reasonable-a determination which
can be satisfactorily made only after a complete survey of
our economic organization and choice between rival philoso-
phies. 8
Price fixing may arise either horizontally when competitors
engage in pricing agreements 9 or vertically when manufacturers,
wholesalers or retailers enter into purchasing and selling ar-
rangements. 20  The application of the per se doctrine to price fix-
ing has judicial precedent for identical application to overseas
ventures as to domestic.2 ' Consequently, the court should con-
tinue finding that tight control of the pricing policies by the parent
of the joint subsidiary abroad is per se unlawful.
Tying Arrangements
A tying arrangement is an agreement under which a seller
agrees to sell one product only on the condition that the buyer
agrees to purchase a second product from the seller. 22  Or, the
agreement may be of the type as to prevent the buyer from pur-
chasing the tied product from any other supplier. Although to
date the Supreme Court has not passed on tying arrangements
between joint venturers abroad, the writer believes that their anti-
competitive nature and effect are such that the courts will not
evaluate them by the rule of reason. In 1969, the Supreme Court
18. U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397, 8 (1927).
19. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. U.S., 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
20. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, rehear-
ing denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1951).
21. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. U.S., 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
22. Northern Pac. Ry. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
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in Fortner Enterprises v. U.S. Steel Corporation,23 reaffirmed its
position as to the per se doctrine's applicability to tying arrange-
ments between domestic joint ventures. However, this is the
first time the Supreme Court has applied the per se doctrine type
of inquiry to tying arrangements between a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary. This is also the first time that the Court has
found no basis for treating credit (the tying product) differently
than goods and services. As a condition of obtaining loans from
the credit corporation for the purchase and development of certain
land, the plaintiff therein was required to agree to purchase at un-
reasonably high prices prefabricated houses manufactured by the
steel corporations. The Court came to the conclusion that "...
tying arrangements generally serve no legitimate business purpose
that cannot be achieved in some less restrictive way . . . [conse-
quently] the presence of any appreciable restraint on competition
provides a sufficient reason for invalidating the tie . . . ." The
dissent pointed out that tying arrangements are fundamentally
evil because they ". . . use the power over one product to attain
power over another, or otherwise to distort freedom of trade and
competition in the second product . . . ." Tying arrangements
according to the Court are "unreasonable in and of themselves
whenever (1) a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce
is affected and (2) a party has sufficient economic power with
respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competi-
tion in the market for the tied product."
Divison of Markets
Horizontal market divisions occur when the competitors di-
vide either the territories or customers among themselves; they
have long been held illegal per se even when the joint venture is
located abroad.24 When a manufacturer allots territories or cus-
tomers to his suppliers, the division is referred to as being vertical.
Until recently, however, division of territories or customers was
not illegal per se because it was felt that a vertical division did not
eliminate competition but was a necessary method of distribution.
It was therefore tested by the rule of reason. Then, with the U.S.
v. Sealy2" and U.S. v. Arnold Schwinn & Co. 28 decisions, per-
23. Fortner Enterprises v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
24. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. U.S., 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
25. U.S. v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
26. U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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missible methods of vertical agreements became prohibited and a
new per se category was added to the list. Sealy cited the Timken
Roller Bearing Co. case 27 as its foremost authority. Because the
territorial restraints were part of the unlawful price-fixing and
policing activities, the Court found that there was an aggregation
of restraints which was illegal per se.
Miscellaneous Per Se Restraints
Group boycotts or concerted refusals to deal is another re-
straint regarded as per se illegal.28  The anticompetitive wrong of
group boycotts is that they coerce parties who are not members
of the group to follow a prescribed course of action. Therefore,
in projecting the treatment of domestic group boycotts to group
boycotts concerning joint ventures abroad, it is suggested that here,
also, they will be conclusively presumed illegal without elaborate
inquiry as to precise harm caused or business excuse. In Hazel-
tine Research v. Zenith Radio Corporation,29 the Court in 1969 ap-
plied the per se doctrine to patent misuse by joint ventures lo-
cated abroad. The Canadian patent pool was formed by General
Electric and Westinghouse subsidiaries located in Canada. The
pool prevented certain products manufactured in the United States
from being imported into Canada by refusing the granting of li-
censes. Hazeltine, which knew of these restrictions against im-
ports by the pools, permitted its patents to be used so that it could
share in the pool's income. The Court found that Hazeltine Re-
search Institute and Hazeltine conspired with the Canadian pool
to deny patent licenses and in so doing violated the Sherman Anti-
trust Act.
In some cases the Court declines to consider the per se legality
of the individual restraints apart from the overall conspiracy.
27. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. U.S., 341 US. 593 (1951).
28. Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc., v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 312 U.S. 457, rehearing denied, 312 U.S. 668 (1941).
29. Zenith Radio Corporation v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
The facts in this case also presented a multiplicity of issues which are not related
to per se or joint ventures. Zenith refused to pay royalties of large sums based
on their entire production of receivers when in their estimation a Hazeltine
patent was not employed in any of its products. Zenith also refused to purchase
a package license in the pool for manufacturing in Canada. Therefore, the
patent pool would threaten dealers that Zenith was attempting to sell with
litigation on any infringement which might happen to fall within any of the
5000 patents listed within the pool. The dealers were thus coerced to refrain
from handling American products.
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Thus, in the case of Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts,30
agreements providing for an aggregation of trade restraints were
prohibited by the Sherman Antitrust Act. Further, the Court
cited Timken by saying that agreements between legally separate
persons and companies suppressing competition among themselves
cannot be justified by characterizing the project a joint venture.
The discussion in this article on per se illegal agreements is
by no means exhaustive, but most recent decisions on joint ven-
tures have been decided on a per se basis, applying the rule of
reason only when the restraint is not of a per se category and does
have redeemable virtue.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST TREATING RESTRAINTS
BY JOINT VENTURERS ABROAD ILLEGAL
PER SE
Additional Obstacles for Joint Venturers Overseas
Because joint ventures in foreign countries have numerous
barriers which domestic ventures do not, many proponents feel
that the per se doctrine should not be used at any time whenever
a joint venture abroad is in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Rather than conclusively presuming certain conduct per se unrea-
sonable, these advocates would allow elaborate inquiry as to the
precise harm that the restraint has caused and the business ex-
cuse. For example, some countries will not allow investment in
their country unless jointly with local citizens.3' Certain enter-
prises, such as communication facilities, transportation industries,
public utilities, and extractive enterprises affecting natural re-
sources are regarded by almost all countries as affecting the public
interest. Accordingly, because they do not wish such enterprises
to fall under foreign control, certain prohibitions are placed upon
foreign participation in the ownership or management. To fur-
ther protect these joint ventures, the local government often re-
quires price and territorial agreements.
Other considerations affecting foreign commerce which are
strikingly different than those affecting domestic commerce are
30. Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts, 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
31. See, e.g., Foreign Investment Laws and Regulations of the Countries of
Asia and the Far East (United Nations, ST/ ECAFE/ 1, 1951); Obstacles to
Direct Foreign Investment, Report Prepared for the Presidents' Committee for
Financing Foreign Trade 1920 (National Industrial Conference Board, 1951).
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import licenses 2 and quotas, currency restrictions, high tariffs, tax
problems, governmental subsidies to a native industry, fear of ex-
propriation and consumer favoritism to local goods. In addition
to these legal, political and economic deterrents, the American
company may not have the financial ability, the expertise, or the
patent availability to proceed alone. Thus some joint activities
may encourage rather than restrain trade by providing means for
sharing risks of business operations located abroad. Is it any
wonder that many proponents feel that finding an identifiable re-
straint is not sufficient when evaluating joint ventures overseas?
Preferably, inquiry is needed as to whether competition is being
promoted, suppressed or destroyed by the restraint.
Foreign Policy Objectives
Some foreign policy objectives require prohibiting the use
of the per se doctrine if the promotion of export trade is deter-
mined to be an important part of our antitrust policy. Our writ-
ten policy as expressed in the Webb-Pomerene Act"3 provides that
"nothing in the Sherman Act shall be construed as declaring an as-
sociation illegal unless such association restrains trade within the
U.S., or restraints the export of a domestic competitor." This
would seem to prohibit the per se type of inquiry, which does not
require proof of actual interference of trade.
The Attorney General's Committee Report34 might also be
considered as authority that defendants should be permitted af-
firmative defenses to show that the conduct abroad constituted no
undue restraint on our foreign commerce under certain conditions.
For example, when the laws of another country require uniform,
32. See, e.g., World Trade Information Service Economic Reports, Law on
the Investment of Foreign Capital in Saudi Arabia at 1-8, Part 1, No. 57-75
(1957). Article 4 provides that non-Saudis may participate in the business listed
in the regulations only after obtaining a license which is renewable annually.
Article 6 states that applications will not be accepted unless at least one of the
partners is a Saudi and the share of the Saudi partner or partners is not less
than 51% of the total capital of the company. Article 7 indicates that Saudi
personnel must consist of 75% of the total employees in the firm and they shall
not receive less than 45% of the total salaries of the non-Saudis. The firm must
train Saudi subjects in its work, particularly in the technical work, so that one
who has received the training can replace one of the non-Saudi personnel.
Article 10 provides that the amount of profits leaving the country annually shall
not exceed the equivalent of 20% of the company capital.
33. 40 STAT. 516 (1918); 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1958).
34. 1955 Att'y Gen. Committee Report at 90-91.
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non-competitive prices by companies doing business there, then
compliance with that law should constitute a defense in this coun-
try to an antitrust charge of price fixing solely in that country.
On the other hand, the Attorney General's Committee Report
would limit the application of the rule of reason by not allowing it
to justify concerted action among competitors to fix market prices,
control production, divide markets, or allocate customers merely
because that is a more profitable way of doing business. Some-
thing more substantial in the way of an affirmative defense is re-
quired if the rule of reason approach is to be employed. The de-
gree of restraint should always be a critical factor as to whether
an inquiry should be made into other factors which may be undue
or unreasonable.
Moreover, the question arises as to whether we should be
concerned about anticompetitive influences on our export com-
merce.8 5 Should the U.S. instead concentrate on restraints on im-
ports which deny its consumers the benefit of competitive selec-
tion? It has been argued that joint ventures manufacturing abroad
compete with and therefore reduce United States exports;36 conse-
quently, they should be held invalid per se.
One writer advocates that per se illegality application of our
antitrust policy offends other nations.17  The contention is made
that the application of U.S. antitrust law to arrangements made in
other countries constitutes intrusion into the internal affairs of that
country. In addition, that particular foreign country is then de-
prived of the benefits of important enterprises. The arrangement
therefore should be deemed valid or not by the place of business
location and not the laws of the United States.
35. The exact effect on United States prices for U.S. consumers is not di-
rectly affected by restraints caused by competitor agreements concerning exports.
Information on the indirect effect is being gathered by certain agencies but until
the data is complete, the courts are guided only by speculation.
36. U.S. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 961-2 (D.
Mass. 1950). A correlation may be drawn although this may not be the only
component between the tremendous production and expansion by the American
joint ventures and branches located abroad and the loss in the relative com-
petitive position of the United States exports in world trade. In 1955 through
1968 the United States export share in the world market dropped from 28%
to 20%. While the manufactured goods from eleven major countries more
than tripled, United States exports in the same types of goods just a little
more than doubled. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Economic
Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1968).
37. G. Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the
Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639 (1954).
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Thus, it is a common occurrence for an American who seeks
to enter into a joint business arrangement abroad to find himself
under greater restraint than his non-American competitor. Ac-
cording to one writer these additional restrictions lead to unde-
sirable consequences.3 Therefore, it may be argued that conduct
should not be branded as illegal per se. Defendants should never
be foreclosed from presenting evidence of economic or other justi-
fication. The per se barrier to affirmative defenses increases the
probabilities of frustrating legitimate expansion of the overseas
commerce of American companies faced with restrictions of for-
eign governments.
Flexibility and Fairness
The rule of reason permits the courts to decide whether the
conduct in question is unreasonably anticompetitive in nature.
The inquiry appraises the characteristics of the business and the
condition before and after the restraints were imposed. The posi-
tion of the company in the market place and the competitive re-
lationship between the joint venturers are also examined. 9 Fur-
ther, the rule of reason explores the character and purpose of the
restraints.
The advantage of the rule of reason is based on its ability to
be sufficiently flexible and fair by taking into account all possi-
bilities and complications that might arise. By analyzing all perti-
nent economic and factual data, a decision regarding the effects
of the joint venture can be made. This type of inquiry always
38. S. Linowitz, Antitrust Laws: A Damper on American Foreign Trade?
44 A.B.A.J. 853, 4 (1958); there is "(1) discouragement of U.S. investments
overseas; (2) loss of income to the United States; (3) loss of association with
overseas industry; (4) compulsion of overseas associates to make arrangements
with other companies in other countries; (5) loss of great opportunity to promote
international good will and friendship; (6) risk that the U.S. will become iso-
lated." Author's note: Even though this argument is set out by those against
the U.S. foreign policy, it seems weak and without merit when viewed in light
of current expansion. Id.
39. U.S. v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527 (1948). An in depth
analysis of the rule of reason is beyond the scope of this paper. For further
information on this subject, see, Federal Antitrust Laws, Lectures on Federal
Antitrust Laws at the University of Michigan Law School (1953): B. Smith, The
Rule of Reason Should Be Modernized 231; W. Berge, Proposals for Expanded
Application of the Rule of Reason 243; J. Burns, Comments on Proposal for
Expanded Application of the Rule of Reason 255. See also L. Loevinger, The
Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 23 (1964); and P. Marcus,
Monopoly Profits, Economic Impossibility, and Unfairness As Antitrust Test, 14
VAry. L. REV. 581 (1961).
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seeks to determine whether the agreement promotes more compe-
tition than it restrains. On the other hand, because this involves
volumes of testimony, time and money, though constituting a fair
method of attacking an antitrust violation, it is often impractical.
40
Imperial Chemical Industries v. U.S. illustrates the applica-
tion of the rule of reason. 4 In speaking of the Sherman Antitrust
Act in relation to joint ventures, the Court states that joint ven-
tures are not unlawful per se but become unlawful only if the pur-
pose or effect of such ventures is to restrain trade or to mo-
nopolize.4 2  However, the Court after examination of voluminous
evidence found conspiracy to divide territories and to eliminate
competition between themselves and with third parties in the trade
and commerce of chemical products, sporting arms, and ammuni-
tion.
THE QUESTION PER SE ILLEGALITY OF
JOINT VENTURES ABROAD
To date, the Supreme Court has had no occasion to pass on
the validity of joint ventures involving lawful motives and limited
restraints not harmful to the public interest. However, in U.S.
v. Minnesota Mining, Judge Wyzanski of the U.S. District Court
40. One of the reasons for the necessity of per se rules is that antitrust
cases on the average have taken five and a half years to complete. M. MASSELL,
COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY 130 (1964).
41. Imperial Chemical Industries, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The
four corporate defendants were Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) organized
under the laws of the United Kingdom, Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. (New
York), wholly owned by ICI, E.I. duPont de Nemours and Company, and Rem-
ington Arms Company. The defendants eliminated competition by establishing
exclusive territories by contract, and by setting up jointly owned companies in
the remaining territories which were non-exclusive by agreement. The rule of
reason analysis was applied by the Court on the issue of establishing territories
through arrangements and understandings. The defendants did not deny that
these agreements involved division of territories but claimed that exclusive
license territories were necessary to prevent exploitation of their own patents by
their competitors. The Court, therefore, inquired into whether the major pur-
pose of the agreements were entered into with a view to divide territories or to
secure the benefit of technology. It concluded that the benefits of technology
could be achieved without territorial allocation; thus the territorial division was
the real purpose of the arrangement. Next, the Court examined the purpose of
the joint ventures which were organized in the remaining non-exclusive territories,
and concluded that their major function was to regulate competition. The Court
would not allow violations of the act which affect American commerce by re-
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strongly proclaimed that joint ventures by American companies
located abroad are illegal per se.13 Judge Wyzanski said:
It may very well be that even though there is an economic or
political barrier which entirely precludes American exports
to a foreign country, a combination of dominant American
manufacturers to establish joint factories for the sole purpose
of serving the internal commerce of that country is a per se
violation of this other clause of the Sherman Act. The inti-
mate association of the principal American producers in
day-to-day manufacturing operations, their exchange of pat-
ent licenses and industrial know-how, and their common ex-
perience in marketing and fixing prices may inevitably reduce
their zeal for competition inter sese in the American market.
. . . It may . . . be subject to condemnation regardless of
the manufacturers' conduct in the foreign countries. In this
aspect the reasonableness of the foreign conduct would,
like the reasonableness of domestic price-fixing be irrele-
vant. . . . (cases cited) Joint foreign factories like joint do-
mestic price-fixing would be invalid per se because they elim-
inate or restrain competition in the American domestic mar-
ket. That suppression of domestic competition is in each
case the fundamental evil, and the good or evil nature of the
immediate manifestations of the producers' joint action is a
superficial consideration. 44
In other words, according to the dictum in this opinion, the joint
formation of an integrated subsidiary which implies that the par-
ents will not compete with each other in the sales area of their
jointly owned subsidiary is not the major wrong involved. Even
the parents dividing the territory among themselves is of small
consideration. The harm or damage results from the joining and
co-operating abroad toward common goals. Their cooperation
abroad would sooner or later extend and affect the competitiveness
between the companies within the American market. Encourag-
43. U.S. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass.
1950). The abrasive manufacturers, Minnesota Mining and Mfg., Behr-Manning
Corporation, Carborundum and Armour, who exported over 80% of the coated
abrasives from the U.S., formed an export company and organized foreign manu-
facturing subsidiaries. Thereafter, each domestic organization agreed to export
only through the export company. Thus, the foreign subsidiaries owned by those
a party to the agreement were then able to acquire the business from those
same foreign markets. U.S. exports decreased to only a few thousand dollars
annually so that effect of this program was to cut off over 80% of the U.S. export
trade in a major area.
44. Id. at 963.
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ing and protecting competition in the United States is crucial.
Consequently, joint ventures should be treated as conclusively un-
reasonable.
In addition, according to a strict interpretation of one deci-
sion,45 certain justices of the Supreme Court would declare joint
ventures illegal per se. Justices Black, Minton and Douglas in
Timken stated that "if . . . [pertaining to the joint venture rela-
tionship] not severed, the intercompany relationships will provide
in the future as they have in the past the temptations and means to
engage in the prohibited conduct. These considerations alone
should be enough to support the divestiture order . . obviously,
the most effective way to suppress further Sherman Antitrust vio-
lations is to end the intercorporate relationship which has been the
core of the conspiracy."46  On the other hand, this decision is also
the most authoritative precedent for the legality of joint-ownership
of foreign companies by competitors. The reasoning for this state-
ment follows from the fact that the majority of the Court denied
the remedy of divestiture and allowed two of them to continue
owning the third, while striking down the three companies' agree-
ment not to compete. The Court further held that (1) the joint
venture of the three Timkens might not by agreement allocate
trade territories or fix prices on products of one sold in the territory
of the others, and (2) the purpose and effect of the Timken combi-
nation was to eliminate competition and therefore unlawful. 47
The Attorney General's Committee Report states that Tim-
ken when read literally led many to believe that the Supreme
Court was actually tending in the direction of holding as an unlaw-
ful conspiracy, action between a parent and wholly owned foreign
subsidiary which would be lawful if engaged in by independent
concerns. 48  But the Timken opinion when read further stated:
• . .[W]e find. . .[no] support in reason or authority for the
proposition that agreements between legally separate persons
45. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. U.S., 341 U.S. 593 (1951). Timken
Roller Bearing Company, an Ohio corporation which owned 30% of British
Timken, joined with British Timken and formed French Timken. The Court
said that these three companies, together, regulated the manufacture and sale of
anti-friction bearings. American Timken sold 70% to 80% of the domestic
tapered bearings in the U.S. market and 25% of the market in all anti-friction
bearings. British and French Timken had similar sales percentage domination
of their local markets.
46. Id. at 600.
47. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. U.S., 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
48. 1955 Att'y Gen. Committee Report at 88.
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and companies to suppress competition among themselves
and others can be justified by labeling the project a joint
venture.
49
In other words, joint ventures are to be treated in per se applica-
tion in the same manner as two corporations of a non-joint venture
nature. This is not to be confused with the circumstances which
make the joint venture association more suspect as indulging in
those practices which violate the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Further, the fear that joint ventures are in themselves per se
illegal is unfounded, because the Supreme Court to date has found
a violation of the antitrust laws only when the joint venture en-
gages in a restraint of the type which has no redeemable virtue
and the companies are dominant in the industry. Moreover, in
both domestic and foreign joint ventures there is little prosecution
of a joint venture whose share in the market is too small to make
any real impact upon the competitive conditions within the in-
dustry." This is not advocating that the rule of reason analysis is
being applied when joint ventures are small rather than large.5'
However, the joint venture is more likely to restrain competition
when dominant in the industry and is therefore more subject to
prosecution.5 2
Thus, it may be concluded that although mere joint owner-
ship is not of itself conclusively illegal, the joint venture may not
engage in restraints in the per se classification. The joint ven-
ture must avoid agreements between the parents with respect to
prices and territories. The subsidiary must be operated and man-
aged independently and the management decisions made in its
own best interests. The sales and purchases between it and the
49. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. U.S., 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
50. See note 4, supra at 406.
51. A small joint venture which has adverse affect regionally may be as
suspect of indulging in antitrust practices as giant corporations on a national
scale.
52. See note 4, supra at 405. Dixon analyzed one anti-competitive reason
that several corporations establish a joint venture, and pointed out the ultimate
evils resulting therefrom. Large corporations, although not having a monopoly
on future opportunities, secure a monopoly when all interested parties move to-
gether in one single venture. For example, a company may desire to join another
competitor currently supplying a particular market. The admission of a new
partner into the venture insures the elimination of an irritating competitor. The
price consequently may become high and inflexible, "new technologies for produc-
tion may be abandoned. . . . [D]ecisions relating to prices, territories, consumer
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parents must be on an arm's length basis. In other words, the ac-
tual practice and operation of the joint venture must be entirely
separate from that of the parents. The joint venturer, by having
a separate staff of employees and separate officers and directors,
can avoid a jointness which is within the area of per se violations.
It should be an investment for the parents rather than an enter-
prise under their management and direction. The antitrust con-
cern arises when the parent, by virtue of its ownership and partici-
pation in the venture, effects restraints which are violative of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.
LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE ANSWERS
Numerous writers have urged that joint ventures abroad be
granted a legislative exemption from the antitrust laws so long as
domestic commerce is unaffected. 58 Professor Brewster suggests
presumptive validity for a joint venture if (a) "the parties were
not in fact actual or potential competitors," or (b) "the size or
risk of the venture make it unreasonable to be done by either party
alone" or (c) "the host government required the pooling of all
prospective investors." 54  Another suggestion is to grant the Presi-
dent the power to exempt specific foreign investment abroad if it
will further our national security or foreign policy.5 Both of
these proposals would require an amendment of the antitrust laws.
It is doubtful that Congress will pass legislation for complete
exemption for joint ventures from the antitrust laws. More prob-
ably, the approach will be to set out certain types of restrictions
which should be tested by the rule of reason. It can be expected
that some will appear during the 93rd Congress because many
bills in the previous sessions have attempted to exempt certain
industries. For example, the Multer Bill56 proposed an amend-
ment to the Federal Trade Commission Act to permit exclusive
territories. This measure perished in the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
To date, most bills on legislative exemptions concerning joint
ventures have been too extensive, thereby allowing defenses in
anticompetitive circumstances which have no valid justification.
53. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. 229 (1964).
54. K. BREWSTER, JR., note 2, supra at 453.
55. Id. at 395.
56. H.R. 974, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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Conversely, some exemptions were too narrow and privileged cer-
tain groups. Therefore, even those who support specific exemp-
tions of certain restraints from the per se category have been
against their passage. Consequently, legislators have accom-
plished few solutions to the problem.
THE ATTITUDE OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
TOWARD PER SE
The Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust
Policy was released in early 1969. The Committee recommended
in regards to certain anticompetitive behaviors such as price fix-
ing and market division that the present laws are generally ade-
quate. 7 Their effectiveness depends upon sufficient enforcement
of laws now in existence.
Under . . . [the rule of reason]58 approach, general stand-
ards expressed in terms of broad policy goals require the
trier of fact to make ad hoc judgments as to the relevant
scope of inquiry in any case. The general effect of such an
approach is to require consideration of a wide range of com-
plex and difficult issues, some of them of marginal signifi-
cance. Such issues may include economic issues which are
beyond our present capacity to gather and evaluate economic
information; they may include issues such as motive and in-
tent, which are both elusive and of marginal relevance to the
central issue of market structure; and they may include an in-
direct measurement of competitive behavior or structure
through an evaluation of performance, an approach requiring
judgments more appropriate to regulation than to antitrust
policy. Such an approach generally expands the scope and
complexity of lawsuits and makes decisions less useful as
precedents.
The . . . [per se doctrine] 59 rules . . . are based on
easily ascertainable criteria and avoid individualized con-
sideration of complex factors which would be unlikely to af-
57. Task Force Report of the White House on Antitrust Policy (Neal Re-
port), Full Text Reprint in ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS REVIEW at 11,
Vol. 2 No. 2 Winter 1969.
58. Although the wording in the report does not indicate that the rule of
reason theory is the one in discussion, this writer feels that sufficient clarity
presents itself to make this insert.
59. Although direct reference is not made to the per se doctrine, the un-
named approach referred to in this report must through inference denote per se
or a relatively unknown approach with similar effects.
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fect the outcome. This approach simplifies litigation. More
importantly, it provides businessmen and law enforcement
officials with a better idea of what will be lawful and what
will be unlawful ...
Therefore, we believe that carefully drawn rules yield
results superior to highly general admonitions to weigh all
relevant factors. . . . [The report then proposes rules
which] are drafted to reflect general economic experience
and theory, and they make allowance for factors which may
be significant in individual cases. But they do not call for
proof of an exactness beyond the present limits of economic
knowledge. Of necessity, they are predicated not on rigor-
ously proven theorems, but on a consensus of informed judg-
ment which admittedly fragmentary economic knowledge
tends to confirm.
IMMEDIATE FUTURE OF PER SE AND
JOINT VENTURES OVERSEAS
It does not appear that our present antitrust policy will change
until there is more availability of economic data. The White
House Task Force recommends the formation of a standing com-
mittee to develop techniques and procedures for collection of
economic data by the Census Bureau and other government or-
ganizations."'
Moreover, while there is much that could be done under the
antitrust laws to prevent new joint ventures abroad and prosecute
existing ones, they have not yet been interfered with to any great
extent for antitrust violations. Thus, in the present attitude of
antitrust enforcement, it seems probable that the joint venture
located overseas is subject to antitrust enforcement only (1) if the
joint venture is brazenly obvious with readily identifiable restraints,
and (2) if the joint venture actually affects trade within the
United States or affects the exports of domestic competitors. And
assuming that this policy continues, inquiries in the immediate fu-
ture are likely to be of per se procedure rather than of the rule of
reason.
In the author's opinion, many of the courts in silence have
weighed the pertinent facts in the style of the rule of reason while
applying per se concepts. Joint ventures abroad which are re-
60. Id. at 23, 24.
61. Id. at 14, 19, 20.
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quired by the host country to participate with their local citizens, or
joint ventures which are using restraints that possibly regulate or
promote competition, are presently having limited antitrust diffi-
culties and are being analyzed by rule of reason. The courts have
rendered mostly per se decisions to date because they could not by
any standard or measure, such as the rule of reason, bring the
agreements of the joint venture into harmony with the antitrust
law. Joint venturers can, by proper planning and by operating
independent of the creators, minimize antitrust involvement. Only
when the parents take too active a part in the venture's operation
will the legality fall under a court's surveillance.
Keith Kellison
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